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Abstract
Gradient descent is arguably one of the most popular online optimization methods with a
wide array of applications. However, the standard implementation where agents simultaneously
update their strategies yields several undesirable properties; strategies diverge away from equi-
librium and regret grows over time. In this paper, we eliminate these negative properties by
introducing a different implementation to obtain finite regret via arbitrary fixed step-size. We
obtain this surprising property by having agents take turns when updating their strategies. In
this setting, we show that an agent that uses gradient descent obtains bounded regret – regardless
of how their opponent updates their strategies. Furthermore, we show that in adversarial set-
tings that agents’ strategies are bounded and cycle when both are using the alternating gradient
descent algorithm.
(a) Player strategies cycle around the max-min
equilibrium.
(b) Agent 1’s regret remains bounded while
oscillating back and forth.
Figure 1: 125 Iterations of Alternating Gradient Descent-Ascent applied in a zero-sum game with
initial condition (x01, x
0
2) = (35, 35), A = [1] and learning rate η1 = η2 = 1/2.
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1 Introduction
Zero-sum games and more generally max-min optimization are amongst the most well studied set-
tings in game theory. Dating back to classic work of von Neumann [1928], that initiated the field of
game theory as a whole, it is well understood that zero-sum games admit a “solution”. The safety
level that each agent can guarantee for themselves, if their were forced to commit to their strategies
first, is exactly equal to the best case payoff they will get if they play second, with full information,
against a rational opponent. This fact that the ordering of the agents does not matter is captured by
arguably the most famous aphorism in game theory, max-min is equal to min-max.
Despite the classically resolved issue of equilibrium computation in zero-sum games, the ques-
tion of analyzing dynamics in zero-sum games is much less understood. Possibly, the most well
known result in the area is that regret minimizing dynamics converge in a time average sense to
max-min equilibria (e.g., Freund and Schapire [1999]). However, up until recently, the day-to-day
behavior of standard classes of online learning dynamics were not understood. For example, does
the day-to-day behavior converge to equilibrium, does it diverge away from it, or does it cycle at a
fixed distance from it? The answer to the above questions turned out to be, Yes, Yes and Yes! Or, to
be more precise, the answer depends critically on the choice of the dynamics.
When studying dynamics in continuous-time, e.g., the continuous time-analogue of Multiplica-
tive Weights Update, replicator dynamics, the dynamics ”cycle” around at a constant Kullback-
Leibler divergence from equilibrium as shown by Piliouras and Shamma [2014]. In fact, this re-
sult generalizes for all continuous-time variants of all Follow-the-Regularized Leader (FTRL) al-
gorithms [Mertikopoulos et al., 2018]. Moreover, these dynamics have bounded (total/aggregate)
regret in arbitrary games. This is an impressive level of regularity and predictability of the dynam-
ics, which despite not being equilibrating, allow us to make strong predictions about their day-to-day
behavior. Behind this clockwork kind of regularity lies the fact that these dynamics are Hamiltonian
[Bailey and Piliouras, 2019a]. As in the case, e.g., of planetary orbits, or a pendulum, there is a lot
of hidden structure in the motion, laws that bind and control the evolution of all particles.
Unfortunately, this level of regularity comes at a cost of using a continuous-time model. This
is of course a simplifying modelling assumption. It does not capture the reality of how games, eco-
nomic competition is played out in practice. More importantly, it fails to capture the reality of some
modern engineering applications, such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [Goodfellow
et al., 2014], where online training algorithms compete against each other to improve two (oppos-
ing) AI algorithms. Hopefully, we could just naively discretize the aforementioned dynamics and
their behavior would for the most part stay intact. Unfortunately, this is far from the truth.
Bailey and Piliouras [2018] first proved that for all Follow-the-Regularized-Leader algorithms
(e.g. Gradient Descent or Multiplicative Weights) diverge away from the Nash equilibrium in zero-
sum games. This is a robust finding that holds regardless of the step-size that the agents are using,
even if the agents are using different or shrinking step-sizes, or even if they are using different
dynamics (i.e., mix-and-match regularizers). Finally, it even extends to network generalizations
of zero-sum games. The proof by picture is as follows: If gradient descent-ascent in continuous-
time moves along a Euclidean ball centered at the equilibrium then the naive discretization takes a
discrete, non-negligible step along the tangent. Hence, the distance (radius) from the equilibrium
grows and we keep moving away from the equilibrium. Even more distressingly, not only are equi-
libria unstable but furthermore the dynamics are formally chaotic as small perturbations of initial
conditions are amplified exponentially fast [Cheung and Piliouras, 2019]. In a nutshell, by discretiz-
ing gradient descent, moving from a differential equation to an actual implementable algorithm, all
system regularity is lost. The discrete and continuous time behavior may only differ by a little bit in
each step, but these errors snowball fast.
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Given the unstable nature of the naive, standard discretization of online gradient descent, several
different training algorithms have been suggested which have been shown to converge provably to
Nash equilibria in zero-sum games such as the extragradient method [Korpelevich, 1976] and its
variants [Gidel et al., 2019a, Mertikopoulos et al., 2019], optimistic mirror descent [Rakhlin and
Sridharan, 2013, Daskalakis et al., 2018, Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018] and some other methods
using negative momentum or second order information [Gidel et al., 2019b, Balduzzi et al., 2018,
Abernethy et al., 2019]. Going back to the picture of simultaneous gradient descent-ascent as a
tangent to a ball centered at equilibrium, these approaches ”corrupt” the dynamics, so that the
discrete-step is now facing the interior of the ball, more like a chord than a tangent, decreasing the
distance from equilibrium and forcing convergence in the long run.
We take a different approach when it comes to discretizing the system dynamics. We ask, as
von Neumann did for equilibrium computation, does the ordering of the agents matter? What if
the min and max agents did not update their behavior simultaneously but instead they took turns.
This is actually common practice in training neural networks as no extra memory is needed to hold
the previous state/parameters of any network. Even for economic competition in markets, this is
a rather reasonable model with firms taking turns responding to the last move of the competition.
Could it be that this standard alternating gradient descent-ascent implementation recovers some of
the impressive regularities of the continuous-time model and if so to what extent?
Our Contributions
We study the behavior of gradient descent with fixed step-size in unconstrained two-agent zero-sum
games. In a twist on the standard theory of online learning, we consider agents that take turns updat-
ing their strategies. We establish that if an agent uses gradient descent with arbitrary fixed step-size
when agents are sequentially updating their strategies, then she obtains bounded regret (Theorem 2)
as depicted in Figure 1b. Moreover, Theorem 2 holds regardless of how her opponent updates his
strategies and therefore the result immediately extends to non-zero-sum games. We establish this
surprising property by showing that an agent’s distance from optimality changes proportionally to
her payoff in any given iteration (Lemma 1). This allows us to compute both the regret and utility
of an agent with only knowledge of the first and last strategy she used, regardless of how her oppo-
nent updates his strategies. The bound on regret quickly follows by considering the worst-case final
strategy.
We further explore the asymptotic properties of alternating gradient descent specifically in the
setting of zero-sum games. We show that when agents use gradient descent sequentially that the
strategies approximately cycle (Theorem 5) as depicted in Figure 1a. More formally, alternating
gradient descent admits Poincare´ recurrence in the setting of two-agent zero-sum games. Theo-
rem 5 is established in two parts: First, we show that the alternating gradient descent algorithm
approximately preserves the distance to the equilibrium (Theorems 8 and 9). Second, we show that
the algorithm preserves volume when updating a measurable set of strategies. Together, these two
properties imply recurrence.
2 Preliminaries
A two-agent zero-sum game consists of two agentsN = {1, 2}where agent i selects a strategy from
Rki . Utilities of both agents are determined via a payoff matrix A ∈ Rk1×k2 . Given that agent i
selects strategy xi ∈ Rki , agent 1 receives utility 〈x1, Ax2〉 and agent 2 receives utility−〈x1, Ax2〉.
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Naturally, both agents want to maximize their payout resulting in the following max-min problem:
max
x1∈Rk1
min
x2∈Rk2
{x1 ·Ax2} (Zero-Sum Game)
2.1 Gradient Descent with Simultaneous Play
In many applications of game theory, agents know neither the payoff matrix nor their opponent’s
strategy. Instead, agents repeatedly play the zero-sum game while updating their strategies itera-
tively. One of the most common methods for updating strategies is the gradient descent algorithm.
In gradient descent, an agent looks at her payout in the previous iteration and then updates her pre-
vious strategies by moving in a most beneficial direction. In the setting of (Zero-Sum Game), this
corresponds to
xt+11 = x
t
1 + η1Ax
t
2
xt+12 = x
t
2 − η2Aᵀxt1.
(SimGD)
where ηi corresponds to agent i’s step-size. The larger the step-size, the more rapidly an agent
responds to information from previous iterations. Gradient descent is often implemented with time
variant step-sizes – most commonly with ηti ∈ Θ(1/
√
t). However, in this paper we focus on fixed
step-sizes.
In this formulation, agents simultaneously update their strategy. That is, xt1 and x
t
2 are played
at the same time. As a result, the cumulative utility of (SimGD) (or any simultaneous update algo-
rithm) for agent 1 after T iterations is
T∑
t=0
〈xt1, Axt2〉. (1)
2.2 Gradient Descent with Alternating Play
In many application of game theory, agents do not update their strategies until they see a change
in the system. In the case of two-agent games, this corresponds to agents updating their strategies
sequentially, i.e., agent 1 updates her strategy, then agent 2 updates his strategy, then agent 1 updates
her strategy and so on. In the setting of gradient descent, this corresponds to
xt+11 = x
t
1 + η1Ax
t
2
xt+12 = x
t
2 − η2Aᵀxt+11 .
(AltGD)
Computing the total utility when agents alternate their updates is slightly different. Agent 1 plays
strategy xt1 against x
t
2 when agent 2 updates his strategy and plays x
t+1
1 against x
t
2 when agent
1 updates her strategy. This results in the following cumulative utility after agent 1 updates her
strategy T times.
T∑
t=0
〈xt+11 + xt1, Axt2〉 (2)
2.3 Regret
The standard way of measuring the performance of an algorithm is by a notion known as regret.
Regret compares the total utility gained by a fixed strategy x1 to the utility agent 1 receives by using
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an algorithm. In the case of simultaneous updates, as in (SimGD), regret is formally given by
〈x1,
T∑
t=0
Axt2〉 −
T∑
t=0
〈xt1, Axt2〉 (Regret for Alternating Play)
where the second term corresponds to the utility agent 1 received by using (SimGD) and first term
corresponds to the utility she would of received if she played x1 on every iteration (assuming agent
2 still uses the strategies {x2}Tt=1). In the case of constrained optimization, regret is typically
evaluated where x1 is the best fixed strategy, i.e., the optimizer of 〈x1,
∑T
t=1Ax
t
2〉. However, in
unconstrained optimization there is rarely an optimizer to this expression.
When agents update sequentially, regret is computed slightly differently. As discussed in the
previous section, agent 1 sees the strategy xt2 twice – once when agent 1 updates and once when
agent 2 updates. As a result, agent 1’s regret when updating sequentially is
〈2x1,
T∑
t=0
Axt2〉 −
T∑
t=0
〈xt+11 + xt1, Axt2〉. (Regret for Sequential Updates)
Typically an algorithm is said to perform well if its regret is bounded above by a sublinear
function with respect to any fixed strategy. If regret grows at a rate of o(T ) with respect to a fixed
strategy, then the average regret grows as at a rate of o(1) and, in the limit, the algorithm performs
no worse on average as that fixed strategy.
2.4 Continuous-Time Gradient Descent: A Motivation for Alternating Play
The primary motivation for this paper is the continuous-time analogue of gradient descent. In par-
ticular, the integration technique used to obtain (AltGD) from the continuous-time analogue well
approximates continuous-time and therefore offer similar guarantees for behavior in the system.
The continuous-time analogue of (SimGD) and (AltGD) is
x1(t) = x1(0) + η1
∫ t
0
Ax2(s)ds
x2(t) = x2(0)− η2
∫ t
0
Aᵀx1(s)ds ,
(ContinuousGD)
where ηi denotes the learning rate used by agent i. (SimGD) is obtained from (ContinuousGD) via
Euler integration, i.e., xti is simply the first order approximation of xi(t) from the point xi(t− 1).
Mertikopoulos et al. [2018] showed that (ContinuousGD) cycles around the equilibrium of the
system on convex orbits. Therefore, (SimGD) should diverge from the equilibrium since it is the
first order approximation of (ContinuousGD). Indeed, this is first formally shown for a more general
class of update rules including gradient descent and multiplicative weights in a paper by Bailey and
Piliouras [2018] and for gradient descent in unconstrained bilinear games by Gidel et al. [2019b].
Moreover, Mertikopoulos et al. [2018] showed that (ContinuousGD) has a surprising property; if
agent 1 uses (ContinuousGD) and agent 2 uses any continuous update rule, then agent 1 obtains
bounded regret. Recall from the previous section that sublinear regret is the desired property in
order to obtain optimal convergence results for online learning. Therefore, (ContinuousGD) obtains
impressive regret and convergence guarantees.
Unfortunately, continuous-time algorithms are difficult to run and online optimization typically
relies on discrete-time algorithms. Regrettably, standard discrete-time algorithms fall short relative
to their continuous-time analogues; it has long been believed that (SimGD) with fixed step-size has
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linear regret and therefore offers no nice long-term guarantees. It can however obtain Θ(
√
T ) regret
by employing decaying step-sizes or after carefully selecting a fixed step-size with prior knowledge
of how long the algorithm will be used [Foster et al., 2016, Hazan et al., 2016]. More recently, Bai-
ley and Piliouras [2019b] showed that (SimGD) with arbitrary fixed step-size also obtains Θ(
√
T )
regret in bounded 2-dimensional zero-sum games and offered experimental evidence to suggest the
result carries over to higher dimensions. However, even these improved guarantees fall short of the
bounded regret obtained by (ContinuousGD).
Bailey and Piliouras [2019a] recently offered an explanation for this contrast. They showed
that (ContinuousGD) forms something known as a Hamiltonian system – a common dynamical
system studied in mathematical physics that explains things like planetary orbits and oscillating
springs. These systems conserve energy – in the case of (ContinuousGD), energy corresponds to
the combined norm of the strategies ||x1||2/η1+||x2||2/η2 partially explaining the cyclic behavior found
by Mertikopoulos et al. [2018]. However, Euler integration is well-known to be a poor estimator
of Hamiltonian systems and it is therefore unsurprising that (ContinuousGD) differs greatly from
(SimGD).
To obtain behavior that is similar to (ContinuousGD), we must use an integration technique
that better preserves the dynamics of the original system. Fortunately, there is a particular class
of integrators known as symplectic integrators that are well-known for their ability to approximate
Hamiltonian systems [Hairer et al., 2006]. In particular, Hairer [2005] showed that symplectic inte-
grators approximately preserve the energy of a Hamiltonian system for exponentially long periods
of time relative to the inverse of the fixed step-size. In the setting of Gradient Descent, that means
that we could approximately preserve the energy in (ContinuousGD) for arbitrarily long periods of
time by applying a symplectic integrator with sufficiently small step-size.
Regrettably, many symplectic integrators would require agents to coordinate when updating
their strategies. By the very nature of a zero-sum game, this coordination would be unnatural and
could only be applied in artificial settings such as GANS. Moreover, in the context of machine
learning, we would like to use a sufficiently large step-size in order to reduce the training time. A
vanishing step size with an increasing horizon would lead to a prohibitively slow training method.
It is straightforward to show that (AltGD) is obtained from (ContinuousGD) via the symplectic
integration technique known as Verlet integration or leapfrogging. By the work of Hairer [2005],
we therefore expect that (AltGD) with fixed step-size should behave similarly to (ContinuousGD) –
at least for exponentially long periods of time relative to the step-size. Indeed we actually show a
stronger result; (AltGD) with a fixed step-size has the same guarantees of (ContinuousGD) forever.
Specifically, if agent 1 uses (AltGD) with arbitrary fixed step-size then she obtains bounded regret
regardless of how her agent’s opponent updates. Moreover, if both agents use (AltGD) then the
quantity
(||xt1||2/η1 + ||xt2||2/η2 + 〈xt1, Axt2〉) is preserved and the strategies {xt1, xt2}∞t=0 cycle for√
η1η2 ≤ 2‖A‖ , allowing step-sizes that do not vanish with an infinite horizon.
We proceed by proving bounded regret in Section 3 and recurrent behavior in Section 4.
3 Bounded Regret with Fixed Step-Size in Gradient Descent.
In this section, our focus we will be on the regret generated by an agent playing according to
(AltGD). Interesting, our result holds no matter how the opponent updates its strategy. This gen-
eral setting is particularly interesting because it is able to model an environment with only partial
information where the agents might even not know that they are playing a game.
Before stating the main theorem of this section, we present a lemma that provides an interpreta-
tion of each agent’s payoff in terms of energy fluctuation. The norm of an agent’s strategy, rescaled
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by its step-size, can be seen as an energy that varies proportionally to its payoff.
Lemma 1. When agent 1 updates via (AltGD), the size of xt1 increases proportionally to agent 1’s
payoff since her update in iteration t. Formally,
||xt+11 ||2 − ||xt1||2
η1
= 〈xt+11 + xt1, Axt2〉. (3)
Similarly, when agent 2 updates via (AltGD), the size of xt2 increases proportionally to agent 2’s
payoff since his update in iteration t. Formally,
||xt+12 ||2 − ||xt2||2
η2
= −〈xt+11 , A(xt+12 + xt2)〉. (4)
Proof. Recall the update rule for agent 1 that updates via (AltGD) is
xt+11 = x
t
1 + η1Ax
t
2 (5)
Thus,
||xt+11 ||2 − ||xt1||2 = ||xt1 + η1Axt2||2 − ||xt1||2 (6)
= ||η1Axt2||2 + 2η1〈xt1, Axt2〉 (7)
= η1〈η1Axt2, Axt2〉+ 2η1〈xt1, Axt2〉 (8)
= η1〈xt+11 − xt1, Axt2〉+ 2η1〈xt1, Axt2〉 (9)
= η1〈xt+11 + xt1, Axt2〉 (10)
completing the proof for agent 1. Similarly for agent 2, the updates via (AltGD) is
xt+12 = x
t
2 − η2Aᵀxt+11 (11)
and thus, we get,
||xt+12 ||2 − ||xt2||2 = ||xt2 − η2Aᵀxt+11 ||2 − ||xt2||2 (12)
= ||η2Aᵀxt+11 ||2 − 2η2〈xt+11 , Axt2〉 (13)
= η2〈Aᵀxt+11 , η2Aᵀxt+11 〉 − 2η2〈xt+11 , Axt2〉 (14)
= η2〈Aᵀxt+11 , xt2 − xt+12 〉 − 2η2〈xt+11 , Axt2〉 (15)
= −η2〈xt+11 , A(xt+12 + xt2)〉 (16)
completing the proof of the lemma.
From this lemma, an explicit bound on the regret of an agent that uses (AltGD) easily follows
independently of what update rule her opponent uses. This result, is a significant improvement in
comparison to the Θ(
√
T ) regret of (SimGD) and surprisingly matches the result on continuous-
time gradient descent provided by Mertikopoulos et al. [2018, Thm. 3.1].
Theorem 2. If agent 1 uses (AltGD) with an arbitrary fixed step-size η1, then she obtains bounded
regret with respect to any fixed strategy x1 regardless of how her opponent updates his strategies.
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Proof. Agent 1’s regret with respect to strategy x1 is
〈2x1,
T∑
t=0
Axt2〉 −
T∑
t=0
〈xt+11 + xt1, Axt2〉 =
〈2x1, xT+11 − x01〉
η1
−
T∑
t=0
||xt+11 ||2 − ||xt1||2
η1
(17)
=
〈2x1, xT+11 − x01〉
η1
− ||x
T+1
1 ||2 − ||x01||2
η1
(18)
=
〈2x1 − xT+11 , xT+11 〉 − 〈2x1 − x01, x01〉
η1
(19)
≤ 〈x
0
1 − 2x1, x01〉+ ‖x1‖2
η1
(20)
since the expression xT+11 7→ 〈2x1 − xT+11 , xT+11 〉 is maximized when xT+11 = x1.
Remark 3. In Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we have shown that we can compute agent 1′s utility and
regret with only knowledge of the first and last strategy she played. Moreover, neither proof requires
knowledge of how the opponent updates or the payoff matrix. Therefore the results of Lemma 1 and
Theorem 2 extend to a variety of other settings including time-variant games (not even necessarily
zero-sum) and one-agent systems with time-variant linear loss functions.
4 Recurrence and Bounded Orbits in Zero-Sum Games
(a) Strategies “cycle” while approximating
||x1||2 + ||x2||2 = 60 with η1 = η2 = 1/2.
(b) Strategies “cycle” while approximating
||x1||2 + 2||x2||2 = 60 with η1 = 1, η2 = 1/2.
Figure 2: Initial strategy (x01, x
0
2) = (60, 0) updated with 50 iterations of (AltGD) with A = [1].
After having shown, in the previous section, that agents that play according to (AltGD) have
bounded regret we would like to investigate the asymptotic properties of their strategies. It has been
recently proved that if each agent’s strategy are updated though (AltGD), then the energy of the
system ‖xt1‖2/η1 + ‖xt2‖2/η2 is bounded above and below [Gidel et al., 2019b, Table 1]. Thus, the
strategies do not converge to the Nash equilibrium of the game. However, this boundedness, might
indicate a cyclic behavior of the strategies. In the context of high dimensional dynamical system,
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this cyclic behavior is encompassed by the notion of Poincare´ recurrence. Intuitively, a dynamical
system is Poincare´ recurrent if almost all trajectories return arbitrarily close to their initial position
infinitely often.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 2, (AltGD) appears to cycle. In this section, we formally prove the
existence of Poincare´ recurrence. Our analysis focuses on the strategies after both agents update –
i.e., {xt1, xt2}∞t=0 – as depicted by the blue triangles in Figure 2. It also straightforward to extend
our analysis to {xt+11 , xt2}∞t=0 (depicted by the red circles in Figure 2) through the same proof
techniques.
More formally, in order to work with this notion of Poincare´ recurrence we need to define a
measure on Rd. In the following, we will use the Lebesgue measure `. We can thus define the
notion of a volume preserving transformation.
Definition 4 (Volume Preserving Transformation [Barreira, 2006]). A volume preserving transfor-
mation is a measurable function T : Rd → Rd such that, for any open set A ∈ Rd, we have
`(A) = `(T−1(A)).
Note that `(A) may be infinite. This notion of volume preserving transformation can be more
generally defined on a orientable manifold. However, in this work, for simplicity, we will stick with
the less general Definition 4. We can thus, state the Poincare´ recurrence theorem.
Theorem 5 (Poincare´ Recurrence [Poincare´, 1890, Barreira, 2006]). If a transformation preserves
volume and has only bounded orbits then it is Poincare´ recurrent, i.e., for each open set there exist
orbits that intersect this set infinitely often.
Furthermore, we can cover any region of Rk1+k2 by countably many balls of radius /2, and
apply the previous theorem to each ball. We conclude that almost every point returns to within an 
of itself. Since  > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that almost every initial point is recurrent. Formally,
we will thus show the following corollary that states the (Poincare´) recurrence of (AltGD).
Corollary 6. For √η1η2 ≤ 2||A|| the (AltGD) dynamic is Poincare´ recurrent. Moreover, for al-
most all initial conditions (x01, x
0
2) there exists an infinite sequence of time periods τn such that the
limn→∞(xτn1 , x
τn
2 ) = (x
0
1, x
0
2).
To show Corollary (6), it suffices to show that (AltGD) has bounded orbits and that (AltGD)
preserves volume. In Section 4.1, we show that the orbits are bounded if
√
η1η2 ≤ 2||A|| . In Section
4.2, we show that volume is preserved regardless of the value of η1 and η2.
4.1 Bounded Orbits
In this section, we prove that if both agents follow (AltGD), then their strategies are bounded. This
result has been already proved by Gidel et al. [2019b] using linear algebra arguments. However,
in this section, we provide the following improvements: (i) We provide a new proof technique that
is potentially generalizable to other geometries (Gidel et al. [2019b]’s proof using linear algebra
argument heavily relies on the euclidean metric making it challenging to generalize to other geome-
tries). (ii) For both the upper-bound and the lower-bound, this new proof technique has a clear
interpretation in terms of energy conservation and provides an explicit dependence on the constants
of the problem.
The notion of conservation of energy we use in this section, is a perturbed version of the energy
used in the continuous case (see Figure 3b for an illustration). If both agents use (AltGD), the sum
of their energies plus a payoff function is constant. More precisely, we have the following theorem.
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(a) Strategies diverging in (SimGD). (b) Strategies approximately preserving
energy in (AltGD).
Figure 3: Initial strategy (x01, x
0
2) = (40, 0) updated by 10 iterations of (SimGD) and (AltGD) with
A = [1], and η1 = η2 = 1/2. The circles denote {x : ||x1||2 + ||x2||2 = 402}.
Lemma 7. If both agents use (AltGD), we have that the following perturbed energy is constant,
||xt1||2
η1
+
||xt2||2
η2
+ 〈xt1, Axt2〉 =
||x01||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
+ 〈x01, Ax02〉 . (21)
Proof. Combining (3) and (4) of Lemma 1 yields
||xt+11 ||2 − ||xt1||2
η1
+
||xt+12 ||2 − ||xt1||2
η2
= 〈xt1, Axt2〉 − 〈xt+11 , Axt+12 〉. (22)
Inductively, this implies the result claimed.
If both agents’ strategies are unidimentional, Lemma 7 has a geometric interpretation: the orbit
of the joint strategy {(xt1, xt2)}∞t=0 belongs to a conic section determined by the equation(
x1√
η1
)2
+
(
x2√
η2
)2
+ a · x1x2 = 0 . (23)
We can show that this conic section is an ellipse if and only if a2− 4η1η2 ≤ 0. Thus, for
√
η1η2 ≤ 2a ,
the strategies are bounded. The eccentricity and the directions of the principal axis heavily depend
on the values of η1 and η2. In Figure 2, we observe these elliptic trajectories in the joint strategies
space for different values of the step-sizes. This geometric argument can be generalized to strategies
belonging to Rk1 ×Rk2 using the singular vectors of A, however, for simplicity, we provide a result
in terms of weighted norms using a more concise proof.
Theorem 8 (Bounded orbits). If both agents use (AltGD) with arbitrary fixed step-sizes, we have
that, for all t ≥ 0,(
1−
√
η1η2‖A‖
2
)( ||xt1||2
η1
+
||xt2||2
η2
)
≤ 〈x01, Ax02〉+ ||x
0
1||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
. (24)
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Thus, if they select their learning rates such that
√
η1η2 ≤ 2‖A‖ , then their strategies are bounded.
Proof. Starting from Lemma 7, we have that,
||xt1||2
η1
+
||xt2||2
η2
=
||x01||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
+ 〈x01, Ax02〉 − 〈xt1, Axt2〉 (25)
≤ ||x
0
1||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
+ 〈x01, Ax02〉+ ||xt1|| · ||Axt2|| (26)
≤ ||x
0
1||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
+ 〈x01, Ax02〉+ ||A|| · ||x1|| · ||x2|| (27)
≤ ||x
0
1||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
+ 〈x01, Ax02〉+
√
η1η2||A||
2
( ||xt1||2
η1
+
||xt2||2
η2
)
(28)
where (26) is the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, (27) follows from the definition of the `2 matrix norm,
and (28) follows since (
√
η2/η1||x1|| −
√
η1/η2||x2||)2 ≥ 0. Rearranging terms yields (24).
Finally, to show that xti is bounded, observe that
√
η1η2 ≤ 2||A|| ⇒ 1−
√
η1η2‖A‖
2 ≥ 0 and
||xt1||2 ≤
〈x01, Ax02〉+ ||x
0
1||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
1
η1
−
√
η2
η1
‖A‖
2
. (29)
Symmetrically,
||xt2||2 ≤
〈x01, Ax02〉+ ||x
0
1||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
1
η2
−
√
η1
η2
‖A‖
2
, (30)
thereby completing the proof of the theorem.
This theorem is enough to insure that (AltGD) has bounded orbits in order to satisfy the hypoth-
esis of Theorem 5. However, it is worth noting that with the same proof technique we can derive a
lower bound on a weighted sum of the norms of each agent’s strategies.
Theorem 9. If both agents use (AltGD) with ||x01||2 + ||x02||2 > 0 and fixed step-sizes such that√
η1η2 ≤ 2‖A‖ , then their strategies are bounded away from the equilibrium (0,0). Formally,(
1 +
√
η1η2‖A‖
2
)( ||xt1||2
η1
+
||xt2||2
η2
)
≥
(
1−
√
η1η2‖A‖
2
)( ||x01||2
η1
+
||x02||2
η2
)
. (31)
Proof. The proof follows identically to Theorem 8 after replacing the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
−〈xt1, Axt2〉 ≤ ||xt1|| · ||Axt2|| with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality 〈xt1, Axt2〉 ≤ ||xt1|| · ||Axt2||. By
taking η1 and η2 sufficiently small and ||x01||2 + ||x02||2 > 0, the right hand side of 31 is positive and
(xt1, x
t
2) is bounded away from (0,0).
Together, Theorems. 8 and 9 indicate that (AltGD) approximately preserves the energy ||x1||2/η1+
||x2||2/η2 as depicted in Figures 2 and 3b. The smaller η1η2 is, the closer to a circle the trajectories
are. This energy preservation does not occur for (SimGD) as illustrated in Figure 3a.
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(a) Volume expands when strategies are
updated with (SimGD).
(b) Volume is preserved when strategies are
updated with (AltGD).
Figure 4: A collection of strategies (a cat) updated by 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and 24 iterations of
(SimGD) and (AltGD) with x1, x2 ∈ R, A = [1], and η1 = η2 = 1/5. The circles denote level sets
of ||x1||2 + ||x2||2.
4.2 Volume Preservation of Alternating Play
In this section, we show that the transformation (AltGD) is volume preserving (Definition 4) as
depicted in Figure 4a. This is in contrast to (SimGD) which expands (see Figure 4a and [Cheung
and Piliouras, 2019]). To show this result, we make use of the following Theorem from [Rudin,
1987].
Theorem 10 (Rudin [1987] Theorem 7.26). Let X be an open set in Rk and T : X → Rk be an
injective differentiable function with continuous partial derivatives, the Jacobian of which is non-
zero for every x ∈ X . Then for any real-valued, compactly supported, continuous function f , with
support contained in T (X ),∫
T (X )
f(v)dv =
∫
X
f(T (x))|det(JT )(x)|dx. (32)
In particular, taking f(v) = 1, ∫
T (X )
dv =
∫
X
|det(JT )(x)|dx (33)
and T is volume preserving if T is continuous differentiable, injective, and |det(JT )| = 1.
Given T : Rn → Rn, the Jacobian of the transformation is JT = [∂T/∂x1 · · · ∂T/∂xn]. The
determinant of the Jacobian of (AltGD) is simple to compute once noticed that (AltGD) can be
written as the composition of two transformations that have block triangular Jacobians. This leads
to the following volume preservation theorem.
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Theorem 11 (Volume Preservation). (AltGD) is volume preserving for any step-sizes and any mea-
surable set of initial conditions.
Proof. (AltGD) can be written as the following two-stage update where agent 1 first updates her
strategy:
x
t+1/2
1 = x
t
1 + η1Ax
t
2
x
t+1/2
2 = x
t
2
(Stage 1)
followed by agent 2 updating his strategy:
xt+11 = x
t+1/2
1
xt+12 = x
t+1/2
2 − η2Aᵀxt+1/21 .
(Stage 2)
The red circles in Figure 2 refer to (Stage 1) while the blue triangles refer to (Stage 2). To show
(AltGD) is volume preserving, it suffices to show that (Stage 1) and (Stage 2) are volume preserving.
Both arguments are identical and we show the result only for (Stage 1).
By Theorem 10, it suffices to show (Stage 1) is continuously differentiable, injective, and has
a Jacobian with determinant equal to one. Trivially, (Stage 1) is continuously differentiable. Next,
we show it is injective.
Suppose (yt1, y
t
2) map to the same (x
t+1/2
1 , x
t+1/2
2 ) when updated with (Stage 1), i.e.,
x
t+1/2
1 = x
t
1 +Ax
t
2 = y
t
1 +Ay
t
2, (34)
x
t+1/2
2 = x
t
2 = y
t
2. (35)
Combining both equalities yields (xt1, x
t
2) = (y
t
1, y
t
2) and (Stage 1) is injective.
Next, we show that the determinant of the Jacobian in (Stage 1) is one. The Jacobian is
J1 =
[
Ik1 η1A
0 Ik2
]
(36)
and det(J1) = det(Ik1) · det(Ik2) = 1. (Stage 1) satisfies all three conditions and therefore is
volume-preserving thereby completing the proof of the theorem.
5 Conclusion
We study a natural implementation of gradient descent dynamics in unconstrained zero-sum games.
In this implementation, the max and min agent take turns updating their strategies after observing
the behavior of their opponent. This dynamic has remarkable properties. First, agents have bounded
regret. In fact, this is true not only in zero-sum games but in any general game and online optimiza-
tion setting. Moreover, in the max-min optimization setting the agents’ strategies remain bounded
for all time and the dynamics preserve volume. In combination these last two properties imply re-
currence, i.e., that the orbits cycle back infinitely often arbitrarily close to their initial conditions.
Such advantageous properties were formerly only known for continuous-time dynamics (e.g., [Pil-
iouras and Shamma, 2014, Mertikopoulos et al., 2018]) and moreover are not true for simultaneous
gradient descent-ascent updates, which is divergent away from equilibrium [Bailey and Piliouras,
2018] and in fact, formally chaotic [Cheung and Piliouras, 2019].
At its core, our approach is based on recent research advances that enable connections be-
tween traditionally separate areas such as game theory, online optimization, Hamiltonian dynamics
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and numerical analysis. Specifically, Bailey and Piliouras [2019a] show a formal interpretation of
continuous time dynamics in games as Hamiltonian systems. Based on this connection, and the nu-
merous advantageous properties of the continuous-time dynamics it make sense to try to discretize
them in a way that mimics the continuous dynamics to a high level of accuracy. From numerical
analysis, it is well known that the primitive Euler approximation, i.e. the standard online optimiza-
tion algorithms are poor approximations. Instead, more elaborate tools have been developed, e.g.,
symplectic integrators that satisfy the volume preserving property of Hamiltonian dynamics as well
as other advantageous properties, e.g., approximate energy preservation (see [Hairer et al., 2006,
Hairer, 2005]). Such symplectic integrator schemes are thus widely applied to the calculations of
long-term evolution of Hamiltonian systems, e.g., planetary, molecular dynamics, a.o. Alternating
gradient descent-ascent, corresponding to a symplectic integration technique known as leapfrog-
ging (Verlet integration), is thus bringing this point of view to game dynamics. We hope that this
link will allow for the development of new exciting results and a more exhaustive exploration of
the connections between physics, online optimization, game theory, chaos theory, and numerical
analysis.
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